ABSTRACT: In this extended abstract, I introduce a framework for understanding the dysfunctional state of the public controversy surrounding genetically modified organisms used for food (GMOf). This framework highlights various ways in which interlocutors fail to engage with the values involved in the controversy, and provides a site for combined work in science communication, philosophy of science, and ethics.
In this paper, I plan to discuss what I call the two-dimensional values gap in the public controversy surrounding genetically modified organisms used for food (GMOf) . By a values gap, I mean a miscommunication, misunderstanding, misrepresentation, or other failure of engagement with the ethical and political values involved in a public controversy.
Roughly, public discourse surrounding GMOf comprises, first, arguments for the development and use of GMOf (pro-arguments, characteristically offered by molecular biologists and agronomists), and second, arguments against the development and use of GMOf (anti-arguments, characteristically offered by environmentalists and activists in alternative food and food justice movements). On the one hand, proponents regularly appeal to the need to "feed the world" by increasing food production over the next several decades (see, for example, Krattiger, 2001; Kuntz, 2012) . Opponents often do not respond to this appeal-for example, by carefully examining available data on yields-but rather dismiss it-asserting that it is flawed without much further elaboration, for example-ignore it, or speculate that organic agriculture will be able to ensure food security.
1 On the other hand, opponents regularly appeal to uncertainties about the nutritional content, long-term health effects, and ecological impacts of the use of GMOf (Lotter, 2008; Waltz, 2009) . Proponents do respond to this worry, but typically by criticizing particular studies or offering logically questionable arguments (Borlaug, 2000; McGloughlin, 1999; Ronald & Adamchak, 2008) . They either dismiss or ignore generic uncertainties about "unknown unknowns," especially those that have not been studied in detail, such as possible cascading long-term health and ecological impacts (Mitchell, 2009 ).
1
For example, a critical report on GMOf that circulated widely among opponents spent only one out of approximately fifty-three pages of text discussing yields, and focused primarily on pesticides and speculation about carcinogens (Shiva, Barker, & Lockhart, 2011) .
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In short, in public discourse surrounding GMOf, proponents and opponents often talk past each other. Each side appeals to its own set of ethical and political values and barely engages with those of the other. This is the first dimension of the values gap. The second dimension concerns the gap between these arguments and another pair of values; these other values are relevant to the GMOf debate, but are not often recognized as such. We might call the values discussed above explicit or foreground values, and the corresponding set implicit or background values.
Consider commercialization first. As of July 2009, approximately 124 GMO events (primarily in food crops, but also including 27 cotton events) are expected to be commercially available by 2015. Of these, 16 exhibit crop composition traits (such as higher nutritional or caloric content), 10 exhibit virus resistance, and only 5 exhibit abiotic stress tolerance (such as salinity or drought tolerance, making them appropriate for adaptation to climate change). By contrast, 57 exhibit insect resistance and 32 exhibit herbicide tolerance, features which are not closely correlated with long-term yield increases. (Fernandez-Cornejo & Caswell, 2006; Gurian-Sherman, 2009; Stein & Rodríguez-Cerezo, 2009 ) These development trends seem to be better explained by the commercialization of GMOf research than efforts to feed the world. That is, when it comes to deciding which GMOf will be developed, commercial values such as maximizing medium-term profits for intellectual property rights (IPR) holders and commercial farmers actually have a much larger influence than feeding the world. Thus, feed the world pro-arguments misrepresent the values that actually direct GMOf use and development.
On the other side, some observers of the GMOf debate have argued that opponents' expressed concerns about health and ecology serve as rhetorical proxies for concerns about economic power, intellectual property, and decision-making authority (Nestle, 2010; Parthasarathy, 2011; Sagar, Daemmrich, & Ashiya, 2000) . Again, GMOf research is heavily funded by private commercial entities, which consequently enjoy extensive IPR over this technology. Insofar as farmers must use GMOf to be competitive, IPR holders enjoy considerable economic power over them. Hence, even though farmers' decisions to adopt GMOf may be economically rational and not coerced, the relationship between farmers and IPR holders may still be exploitative (Qaim, 2009; Liberto, n.d.) . Companies such as Monsanto have been accused of excessive IP lawsuits and lobbying to expand their power over farmers who do not use GMOf (Charles, 2012; Eichenwald, Kolata, & Petersen, 2001) . As noted in the last paragraph, the interests of subsistence and peasant farmers do not seem to be reflected in the development trajectory of GMOf. And, finally, regulatory decisions to approve the commercial sale of GMOf seeds and food products are generally made by officials in government bureaucracies under significant pressure from industry lobbyists; farmers as such and the general public play a very limited role in this process.
As social scientists have already documented, when anti-GMOf activists raise these concerns, they are marginalized (Bronson, 2010; Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004) . This can be done in several ways. At the level of language, proponents and policymakers might reinterpret these concerns as health and safety concerns, or simply ignore language that cannot be interpreted in terms of health and safety. Or these concerns might be construed as "nonscientific" and "emotional," and so dismissed as irrelevant to science-or evidence-based risk assessment and policymaking. Or opponents making these concerns might be construed as lacking expertise on, say, economics or patent law, and hence lacking the authority to raise arguments based on these concerns. This marginalization itself constitutes part of this values gap: these concerns about power, authority, and property are misunderstood or misrepresented.
In order to resist marginalization-whether intentionally or unintentionally-opponents of GMOf themselves might recast these concerns in terms of health and safety. In this case, their explicit arguments misrepresent the values that best explain their opposition to GMOf. For example, if opponents of GMOf could provide solid evidence that a certain GMOf corn event causes cancer, this would be regarded as a good reason to ban this corn from the marketplace; however, if opponents of GMOf could provide solid evidence that the IPR regime creates oligopolies in the agricultural seed market, this would not be regarded as a good reason to change the IPR regime.
This values gap framework suggests an interesting site for combined work in science communication, philosophy of science, and ethics. Empirical tools from science communication help us characterize the values at play in the GMOf debate and the specific ways in which the interlocutors fail to engage with them. Philosophy of science-especially the science and values literature-gives us normative tools for mapping the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of these values in scientific research (Anderson, 2004; Douglas, 2009; Elliott, 2012) . And ethics-specifically political philosophy-help us relate these value gaps to the depoliticization of US society and the ethical valence of market transactions (MacIntyre, 1997 (MacIntyre, /1998 Sandel, 2012; Satz, 2010; Young, 1990 Young, , 2001 
